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OADR

~~FILE~~

(44)

MEMORANDUM

R

TO: Chief of Operations
FROM: ARA - Mr. Hurwitch
SUBJECT: End of Phase I Report

DATE: July 26, 1962

In the draft of my contribution to the report, a paragraph was inadvertently omitted by my secretary and which I did not catch. There is attached a copy of the omitted paragraph which should become the final paragraph of comment on course of action (a).

I shall appreciate your distributing copies of the omitted paragraph to the addressees of the Report, so that the comment (a) will be properly balanced.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by Evolve

DATE 01/07/60

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FOI, E.O. or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by Moskowitz

DATE 3/18/68

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FOI, E.O. or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

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ARA:RAHurstwitch:lp

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(PD)
File 736 #1
7-31-59

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If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that a) the Castro regime would be enabled to consolidate its position at its own pace, b) Cuba would remain a base of subversive activities in the Hemisphere which we could probably not control effectively; c) the morale of anti-Castro Cubans both in and out of Cuba would be weakened; d) Cuba might acquire offensive weapons from the Bloc which might necessitate costly redeployment of U.S. forces (acquisition of such weapons could occur irrespective of U.S. courses of action as long as the Castro regime remained); and e) achievement of the overthrow of the Castro regime would probably be less likely.

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